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Russia Will Spread Her Errors ...
Raising Up Wars and Persecutions

You will not likely hear about this news from the mainstream media. It is censored out. After reading the following, you cannot but conclude that the errors of Russia prophesied by Our Lady still continue, and worse, are escalating. These reports are but one of the many proofs that Russia has NOT been consecrated according to Our Lady of Fatima's requests. We urge you to spread this censored news around to family and friends who may already have been convinced by the mainstream media that "all is well" and thus have let down their defenses.

Sergei Stepashin: Not A Nice Man To Know

The odious former Russian Minister of Interior (MVD chief), Sergei V. Stepashin, aged 47, was elevated to the post of Russian Prime Minister on May 19, 1999, following 'confirmation' by the rubber-stamp Duma, after the 'dismissal' of Yevgeniy Primakov*.

Careful observers will have noticed a photograph which appeared in The New York Times on the day following Stepashin's 'easy confirmation' by 301 votes to 55 in the Duma. He was roaring with laughter, with his hand on his forehead. Studying the picture, one can see that his laughter appears to be mocking laughter — the kind of laughter one would expect of a servant of the collective who has just been ordered to take the top overt post, and who knows that the 'democratic confirmation' process is a charade.

However all this was beyond the confused Westerners in Moscow who were consulted for press reports on the matter. 'I have been pleasantly surprised', said Margot Jacobs, an analyst for United Financial Group, a Moscow-based firm.

The US State Department is well aware that Mr. Stepashin is not nice to know, as it states as follows, on page 1436 of its report on Russia in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998 - Volume II: 'An undetermined number — up to tens of thousands — of detainees and prison inmates died after beatings by security officials or due to harsh conditions in detention'.

The MVD (Ministry of Interior) under Stepashin is/was in charge of about 85% of the prison system and of SIZOs (pretrial detention facilities) where overcrowding is rampant and the authorities routinely employ harsh abuse and torture to coerce confessions; but, possibly in preparation for Stepashin's current overt post, 'formal' responsibility for the MVD's incarceration apparatus was transferred to the Ministry of Justice — a move which appeared to lack any real content. Indeed, this reform would seem to have stemmed from an outbreak of calculated 'glasnost' associated with controlled Russian 'news' agency reports on June 25, 1998, to the effect that the Procurator General, Skuratov (who 'resigned' early this year), had written to the Minister of Interior, Sergei Stepashin, to inform him that human rights in his prisons are 'systematically and massively violated'. The significance of such an acknowledgment should be understood. It is intended to be widely mistaken by alarmed observers in the West as indicating an official willingness to rectify matters, which could not be further from the truth.

The new Russian Prime Minister, while Minister of Interior, employed five methods by which his 'law enforcement' thugs gained, and continue to gain, confessions or to assert control over and abuse prisoners. The 'elephant' involves placing a gas mask over the head of the victim and then restricting or cutting off the flow of oxygen, with tear gas sometimes introduced as well, to induce vomiting. The 'swallow' involves binding the victim's hands behind his back above the level of his head, forcing painful arching of the back. This method is typically employed either with the 'elephant', or separately, with the victim suspended from the wall or ceiling so that he can be beaten. The 'envelope' involves securing the victim's legs near his head. The 'press-camera' is a system whereby violent prisoners are co-opted by guards and used to control or punish other prisoners — on pain of violent punishment themselves. The co-opted prisoners are permitted to torture their co-prisoners, or to 'deal with' problematical prisoners. Finally, the 'crucifixion of Christ' involves the victim being secured spread-eagled to either a metal cot or to prison bars, to which powerful electric shocks are applied.

These details, corroborated by several respected sources and cited by the State Department, confirm that the repression system under Yeltsin's latest Prime Minister is far worse than has at times been reported even under overt Communism. Indeed, given the West's sycophantic and open-ended support, the covert Communist Yeltsin regime does just as it likes. [Taken from Soviet Analyst, July, 1999]

*'Dismissal' is a method extensively employed by the strategic collective, both under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, to move key 'visible' strategic implementers around the chessboard. Western observers persist with the erroneous belief that the personalities in view 'contend for power', as in the West — whereas, as servants of the collective, they obey to the letter the strategic collective's orders, which are not normally open to amendment or variation. Primakov, therefore, departed for other tasks, although no Western analysts we know of have bothered to enquire what has become of him.

Continuity of Spying –
And No One Ever Asks: WHY?

At not infrequent intervals, reports of Western collaborators suspected of passing secrets to the Soviet Union surface in the press. David Boone, aged 46, appeared in a suburban Arlington, VA, court on October 13, 1998 accused of handing intelligence data and defense secrets stolen from the highly secret National Security Agency [NSA] to a Russian spy-handler code-named 'Igor'. Specifically, Boone was accused of selling US military secrets to the Soviet Union between 1988 and 1991, while working as a code-breaker at the NSA. He was said to have revealed US planning for the targeting of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack, and to have given 'Igor' details of NSA eavesdropping intercepts. The Justice Department also accused Boone of selling 'top secret' data and 'sensitive compartmented information,' which 'could potentially cause grave harm to the national security of the United States'. The court was told, crucially, 'that the accused had allegedly arranged to continue spying while he worked as an analyst for the US Army in Augsburg, Germany, during 1988-91, and to continue after he left the military'. In other words, Boone's spying activities and collaboration with Moscow's structures persisted after the 'changes' of 1991 — when, of course, the United States and Russia had become 'partners' hadn't they, so that there could not possibly have been any further need for Boone's services. The difficulty facing Western Governments these days (several cases have been noted in Britain, for instance) when prosecuting spies arrested for working with the Soviet Union, is how to 'deal with' the awkward reality that such activities did not cease when the miraculous overnight 'transformations' took place ('collapsible Communism', etc.). No doubt the U.S. Justice Department and the relevant UK authorities will have hoped that their cases could have been presented in such a way as to 'draw a veil over' such politically inconvenient realities. [Taken from Soviet Analyst, April, 1999]


The most lastingly successful disinformation operation of Leninist Communism has been the 'rubbishing' of the concept of conspiracy. By 'discrediting' all conspiracies in the Western pragmatic mind, the revolutionaries have obtained free rein for their own diabolical conspiracy. Moreover they have achieved this 'desirable' (from their point of view) objective despite the fact that Lenin himself wrote on several occasions that the Communist World Revolution was a conspiracy.

For instance, writing in What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement, Lenin confirmed, in his usual pedantic manner, that 'in form, such a strong revolutionary organization ... may also be described as a "conspiratorial organization", because the French word 'conspiration' is the equivalent of the Russian word 'zagovor' ('conspiracy'), and such an organization must have the utmost secrecy.'

Thus underground activity (the norm under 'post'-Communism, or what we prefer to call covert Communism, today) is integral to Party operations — as a Communist 'Information Bulletin' (a supplement to 'World Marxist Review') dating from 1971, reporting a Plenum Meeting of the Greek Communist Party stressed: 'It is imperative [for Party workers and members] to understand that every Communist must be well trained in underground activities. Conditions of underground work require that Party members ... gain experience in underground work [and] be irreconcilable towards any violation of the rules of conspiracy.' This illuminates the situation today — in which all the 'players on the stage' are secret continuing Communist Party members, trained in underground work.

And in his 'Collected Works' [International Publishers, New York, Volume 5, page 475] Vladimir Lenin wrote: 'Secrecy is such a necessary condition for this kind of organization that all other conditions (number and selection of members, functions, etc.) must be made to conform to it.' In other words, the maintenance of secrecy is the primary feature of Communist activity — which answers the taunt, often made, that if what, e.g., Soviet Analyst publishes is true, 'the deception would have been exposed by a senior Party official by now'. Lenin continued: 'It would be naive indeed, therefore, to fear the charge that we Social-Democrats desire to create a conspiratorial organization.' And in the next paragraph, Lenin wrote of the Revolution as 'a powerful and strictly secret organization, which concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret activitus, an organization which of necessity is centralized. So the stale, reiterated jibe that people like us are 'conspiracy nuts' should be refuted by citing the above quotations from Lenin's writings — and with the contempt it deserves. [Taken from Soviet Analyst, July, 1999]

Russian Spetsnaz Operations In Serbia

Suspicious Russian Operatives

We know about the Russian provocation at Pristina airport. What about the ongoing provocations committed by Soviet spetsnaz troops operating in Serbia? A special informant tells Soviet Analyst that in 1997, he travelled on a train in Ukraine which was full of Russians who openly acknowledged that they were en route to fight in Yugoslavia. Recently, 'Serbian' troops, wearing local uniforms, were overheard speaking Russian among themselves. Now we learn on special authority that Russian death units directed atrocities in Serbia, provoking the demonic Western intervention which ended so 'satisfactorily' for the Russians.

On June 23, 1999, an Associated Press report cited a Pentagon spokesman, Kenneth Bacon, as confirming that 'Russian mercenaries [sic!] fought in Kosovo alongside Serb forces', and that 'their role is likely to be examined as part of an international investigation of war crimes against ethnic Albanians.

'We certainly know that Russians participated. Russian volunteers, mercenaries we [want to] believe, did participate with paramilitary and other Serb forces'. Bacon had been asked to comment on a Newsday report that Russian 'volunteers' had participated in the killing of ethnic Albanians and the destruction of towns and villages around Prizren in southern Kosovo.

'We do believe that there was some Russian participation.' Mr. Bacon added that the Pentagon had no independent confirmation of the Newsday and other reports on Russian involvement in Kosovo. But German troops did order a group of some 60 Russians out of Kosovo in mid-June. Commanded by a colonel, they were organized as a single unit, and operated under the Special Purpose Police of the Belgrade Federal Ministry of the Interior. The AP report added that 'the matter of Russia's role in Kosovo is sensitive — meaning it is being covered up. Central to the cover-up is the lie that the Russian troops were 'mercenaries'. [Taken from Soviet Analyst, July, 1999]

Folly Of Lending To Russians Exposed

The international financial community has lost billions of dollars in funds foolishly lent to the clique of Bolsheviks who reign supreme, as before the 'changes' of 1991, in Moscow. This public money has been squandered because the international (and national) policymaking classes have convinced themselves that the 'transformation' of the 'former' USSR was genuine, rather than, as Soviet Analyst has accurately maintained all along, a strategic deception.

Missing Funds Pass Through Jersey (Island)

The International Monetary Fund began feeling the heat in earnest at the beginning of February, after press reports that the Prosecutor General, Yuri Skuratov, told the Duma ('legislature') in a letter, before 'resigning' on February 2, that the Russian Central Bank had transferred the equivalent of about $50.3 billion since 1993 to a company registered in Jersey calling itself Financial Management Company [or FIMACO], which has a mere £600 in charter capital. It was set up in November 1990 (providing further proof of 'forward planning', since the Leninist 'changes', including the orchestrated 'August coup' did not take place until 1991) by the Jersey legal firm of Ogier and Le Mesurier, who provided the three partners listed, in the manner of offshore companies, as founder members (shareholders). Skuratov's letter stated that the Russian Central Bank had diverted from the currency reserves US$37 billion, DM9.98 billion, Y379.9 billion, FFr11.98 billion and UK£662.5 billion.

In 'response', the former head of the Russian Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin, confirmed, in a letter to President Yeltsin (all this correspondence being instantaneously made public) that cash reserves were indeed transferred to a Jersey-registered company between 1993 and 1997. That way inter alia, they 'vanished' from the view of international lenders such as the IMF. However Dubinin claimed that reserves had been transferred to FIMACO to protect the Central Bank at a time when the 'country' was discussing the restructuring of 'former Soviet debts' and one creditor had launched a legal action to try to recover assets. But Dubinin disputed Skuratov's arithmetic, asserting that far from having diverted $50.3 billion, the Central Bank had rerouted 'only' $1.4 billion. The 'truth' has thus been buried.

Investigations in Jersey have revealed that FIMACO was set up in 1990 on behalf of the ('former Soviet') French-registered Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (Eurobank), 77.75% owned by the Russian Central Bank, and in which a number of Russian 'companies' have minority stakes, including the diamond firm ALROSA and the oil corporations Yukos and Rosneft. For the first two years of its existence, FIMACO was managed by the local trust division of The Royal Bank of Scotland, while three of their subsidiaries became FIMACO shareholders. However their involvement with the company appears to have ceased in 1998, as the current shareholders are listed as Ogier Nominees Ltd., and Ogier Secretaries Ltd. Analysts now believe that FIMACO forms part of a circle of companies set up to serve continuing Soviet nomenklaturist interests, providing a reliable sluice mechanism for channeling funds abroad.

Capital flight out of Russia over the past decade has exceeded $150 billion. 'It's outrageous', said Eric Kraus, a debt analyst with Dresdner, Kleinwort Benson in Moscow. His Moscow-based colleague, Tom Balastrery, of First Mercantile Capital Group, added on February 6: 'It's a scam, probably organized by the bankers themselves.'

It's worse than that. The Leninist rulers of Russia are crooks, with no intention of honoring obligations. Don't expect the West to learn political lessons from this, though. [Taken from Soviet Analyst, April 1999]

Yeltsin Relies On KGB Men
To Keep The Kremlin In Control:

In this MEDIA MONITOR article — "Soviet Analyst" points out various serious errors in the report by Marcus Warren — veteran Moscow correspondent writing in "The Daily Telegraph," London 19 Feb. 1999.

KGB veterans 'are making a powerful comeback at the heart of Moscow's political establishment, with scores of top jobs going to former agents', wrote The Daily Telegraph's ace Moscow correspondent in a prominent story published in mid-February. To the 'consternation of many in Russia', key posts 'in the Kremlin and the government, the arms industry and the media — even that of head of Russia's fisheries committee — have recently gone to career security officers, and the trend seems set to continue'.

Vladimir Makarov, head of Kremlin personnel policy, had recently been ordered to 'improve work' and to fill vacancies with individuals who 'correspond to the demands of the time'. Having served as head of 'KGB personnel before the collapse of the Soviet Union', Makarov 'was widely expected to interpret his boss's instructions as a signal to recruit more former comrades to influential jobs within the Kremlin' where they will join 'other KGB men already in place', including Nikolai Bordyuzha, the President's Chief of Staff and the current head of the supra governmental 'Security Council', and Vladimir Osipov, the President's own personnel director.

Marcus Warren thinks that Yeltsin was 'filled with a lasting aversion to the KGB' following his 'expulsion from the Politburo in 1988 (which followed that of KGB General Gaidar Aliyev in 1987, giving time for Aliyev to position himself in the Caucasus, where he was later to emerge as the 'Shevardnadze of Azerbaijan'). Nor, Warren believes, was Yeltsin enamored of the KGB's role during the 'August coup' in 1991. Now, poor man, having — as earlier dispatches from Moscow had reported — sacked half his staff in his 'latest faltering attempt to show he is in control' [pace The Daily Telegraph, February 3], Yeltsin, in the closing phase of his presidency, had 'fallen out with most of his trusted advisers'. It was 'especially curious' that Yeltsin now appears to feel secure surrounded by products of the notorious Soviet intelligence service'.

He 'increasingly seems to believe that his only hope of survival is to rely on the cloak-and-dagger skills and absolute discretion of former KGB officers'. Never mind that Yevgeniy Primakov, the 'former' head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, a long-serving KGB officer and top deception strategist who, a Soviet defector with whom we are in contact informs us, 'was always senior to Yeltsin', engineered his own elevation — first to replace the brilliant Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister, and last summer to displace the stop-gap Russian Premier, Sergei Kiryenko. And let us not quibble over the fact, which Mr. Warren cannot grasp, that it is not Yeltsin who gives instructions, but the 'head' of the strategic collective, Primakov.

The interesting question is: how is it possible for the Moscow correspondent of a British newspaper, perhaps the best in the world, to remain so clueless about who calls the shots in Moscow?

Warren's report implied that the flooding of the official structures with KGB officers was some kind of 'new' phenomenon. He has, throughout his service in Moscow, remained chronically ignorant of the reality that the KGB is in charge of the strategy, in every sense; like his successive colleagues reporting from the Russian capital for The New York Times, he has seen everything, but understood nothing.

A glance at his own news clippings file would surely have unearthed reports such as the following: 'KGB regains lost [sic] power' [The Daily Telegraph, January 27, 1998]; 'Russia moves to beef up its secret police' [Washington Post, March 1, 1995]; 'Security service revives old fears' [The Washington Times, January 16, 1996]; 'Russian security shake-up revives KGB in new guise' [The Times, London, September 8, 1995]; '[KGB] Bodyguard [General Aleksandr Korzhakov] makes presence felt in Kremlin corridors'; 'Whiff of old Soviet ways in the Kremlin [The New York Times, May 24, 1995]; and so forth. The Daily Telegraph's Moscow correspondent finds it extraordinary that Primakov's structures are packed with KGB officers, despite the obvious reality that the KGB-GRU is in the driver's seat, serving the secretly continuing CPSU, having created the driver's seat in the first place. Trying to unravel events without this knowledge is sterile. [Taken from Soviet Analyst April, 1999]

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